sudanapg.org

Politics and Violence in Sudan

Presentation and Q&A with Sadig al Mahdi, 15th January 2008

Palace of Westminster

The following are summary notes of a presentation and Q & A with Sadig Al Mahdi, former Prime Minister of Sudan, leader of the Umma Party (Mainstream), and Imam of the Alansar on January 15th 2008.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

The CPA represents a great breakthrough as the first attempt at sharing wealth and putting onto paper a programme for co-existence but it is failing in its objectives.

The main targets are:

Comprehensive peace
To make unity attractive
To effect a programme of democratisation
To set up a government of national unity that would administer the country until 2009

However none of the so-called main objectives have been realised:

The existing peace is by no means comprehensive, and while the CPA was being signed war was being waged elsewhere in the country
The agreement monopolised power in the North. Furthermore, the North and the South have such opposing political views that they have created a ‘Cold War’ type scenario where unity is not attractive
Democratic progress is heralded by the fact that an agreement accepts international charters for human rights. However, as the NCP has protected its repressive laws, a totalitarian rule is still in place
While the government of national unity did include some other members of the Sudanese political society, it excluded many major members

Darfur

Abuja was a sham agreement which only one faction signed. Affairs in Darfur became worse after the agreement was signed in May 2006.

Eastern Sudan

The ESPA was signed by two factions who were based in Eritrea, but was not accepted by all other stakeholders in the East; therefore as an instrument for peace it is very limited.

The Piece-meal Approach

The three agreements that were supposed to lead towards a new Sudan have not worked. Furthermore, the agreements have not really worked together in any credible way - there has been no comprehensive peace, but a lot of confrontation. The conflict in Darfur is spreading east into Kordofan and west into Chad, resulting in a proxy conflict between the Sudanese government and Chadian government.

The international community has made large contributions, particularly in helping to get the CPA signed, but can also be apportioned a certain amount of blame. Whereas the parties to the agreement were always going to be shackled by their own priorities, the international community were well placed to see a comprehensive picture and the need for it. They did not, instead engaging in pre-emptive celebration when the agreements were signed.

What now?

The agreements have focused on two stakeholders: the coup makers and the warlords, excluding all other parties and members of Sudanese political and civil society. For the international community to accept this tense quagmire is wholly unacceptable. No one wants to unravel the agreements and to start from square one, so what can be done?

The Umma party has engaged in a scheme to talk to all parties from across the whole country, including opposition parties and factions, with a view to building a positive agreement that would go further in achieving a real comprehensive agreement which gets all on board. Bilateral agreements have not achieved anything, but instead have set the precedent for other parties to come and seek the same through the same means, thus resulting in a domino effect.

At this all party conference, we hope to stimulate an all inclusive dialogue with the goal of getting all to agree on how to reconcile their different interests and formulate a programme for free and fair elections. The international community can play a key role in helping the Sudanese to help themselves to reach a globally acceptable roadmap with their endorsement in order to establish a new alternative as a new dynamic in the set up. This will also move away from the former bilateral, exclusive precedent. It is hoped that the international community will do what they can and use their clout to support the programme, which has potential to resonate elsewhere.

QUESTION

Generally the pattern has emerged, that when you think you have included all the factions, more seem to form. Do you have an answer to this? Is there a limit to the number of divisions that can happen?

Answer:

The whole process has contributed to factionalism. In the 1990s all the parties held a conference and it was agreed that we should not think of the problems as between the North and South, but think of the whole country. The shared regional concerns converge on many issues - religion, tribalism etc. The only exception is in the South, which is sufficiently special. All the other regions with the South have the same kind of problems. A lack of this approach has made the scenario for the South appeal for others in the East and West, and so CPA has been challenged as it concentrates on the North/South and forgets the North/North and South/South problems.

Factionalism in Darfur is a direct result of the fact that an agreement which was called ‘comprehensive’ has only divided considerations in two, with no recognition of any other problems. At Abuja Darfurians were brought in and their arms were twisted to get them to sign the agreement, however only one party did, and under very false pretenses. The US promised that if they signed, they would be ‘Darfur’ - a promise that could not be delivered. Furthermore, it was implied that if the Sudanese government signed the agreement the other factions who refused to sign would be labelled as ‘terrorist’ and a united front would be presented against them.

In general, the Sudanese government are experts at dividing and ruling. To continue this approach will lead to more and more factionalism, and the present divisions cannot be sustained as it is.

The international community is really to blame and should have seen beyond the needs of the immediate parties. They would have been, could have been, are in a position to look beyond the interests of the immediate parties and use their clout to point out key concerns rather than engaging in wishful thinking such as with the Darfur agreement. The international community has not only gone along with the mistaken attitudes of the two parties, but have influenced the current attitude towards bilateralism. The report of the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was very influential in deflecting attention from the whole country towards only the North and South in Asmara. This myopic vision has also influenced the CPA so that rather than thinking in terms of a comprehensive peace and democratisation, focus has been drawn towards the relations between the North and South, assuming: 1) the problems of Sudan are the problems of the North and South; 2) the SPLM represents the whole of the South, and the NCP the whole of the North.

QUESTION

Regarding the influence of the international community, when the Khartoum regime is being discussed, it is often implied that as long as they have China and Asia to turn to, the UK has little influence. What is your perspective on this?

Answer

The UK continues to be very influential. Since 1959 the UK has been appointed chair of the Evaluation Commission and has had many key roles. It is my own belief that a lot of influence has been squandered as a result of the wrong analysis of the situation and a lack of involvement with the Sudanese political society. Interest has been very badly articulated, for example with US sanctions. These sanctions have played into the hands of the NCP, and their universal application to all Northerners has encouraged them to rally around the NCP, where those who don’t have suffered two-fold. There has been no strategy about the deployment of clout, and the opportunity has been squandered. It is true that China has power of veto, but they themselves are susceptible to being influenced by the West.

QUESTION

Much is happening in Kordofan, but not being reported. What is your analysis of the dangers?

Answer

There are two basic problems that could cause trouble and reproduce: 1) the problems in West Kordofan are related to the spread of troubles from East Darfur; and 2) Abyei, one of the twenty time bombs from the CPA. The warnings from the Umma of the twenty time bombs fell on deaf ears in the international community, but now they are beginning to see there is something wrong and to listen. Any company entering into an investment will only do so after looking at the feasibility of the enterprise. The problem in Kordofan is causing upheaval which, if not controlled, has the potential to spread to Khartoum.

QUESTION

What is your view of the game plan and strategy of the Sudanese government - do they have one, and what do they expect to happen in the long term?

Answer

They have no strategy for how to redress the failures of the CPA, DPA etc. There are some very destructive ideas floating around - some say we should let Darfur stew in its own juice and let the situation develop into a free for all in order to try to seek a comprehensive agreement that they may respond to. There is no strategy - the government is living day to day, and every day there is a new crisis.

QUESTION

The timescale for elections is short. Where are we with the process and what is the outlook?

Answer

Certain conditions are not being met for:

The repatriation of IDPs
The demarcation of borders
The census
Security in Darfur and in the South

These preconditions must be in place, and any agreement needs to have the consensus of all the parties, especially on the practical details in order to ensure elections are free and fair. If they are fulfilled, there will be free and fair elections. If not, we will all boycott the elections and say so.

QUESTION

Would the new agreement run alongside the existing agreements or replace them? For example, where as the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement appears to be progressing well on paper, in practice there is much discontent with the agreement, particularly among the urban youth, and a failure of the Eastern Front to organise politically.

Answer

While the CPA has been accepted, many have rejected the agreements of the East and West and expressed discontent. The CPA has fixed principles for the North and South which need to be extended to all other areas of the country, rather than the agreements being influenced by the cajoling and bartering that was used. The new agreement would work with the CPA and extend the principles to all areas of the country.

QUESTION

Answer

There is some warmth and good relations between the present leadership of the North and South. However, there are some groups with more extreme views - for example the Arabic Dibatia, Northern separatists who would wage a very intense cold war against any relations with the South. They look back to colonialist demarcation and so want secession. This feeling is reciprocated by some Southerners, who use rejectionist language. And so the situation in terms of warmth is different. There is the potential for very warm relations, where some people in the North are very keen on unity and people the South think so too. For the North, it is important to keep a check on finances, and as long as the country is inclusive, there will always be a more moderate expression of identity. For the South, unity would help mitigate tribalism, as there is less tribalist exclusiveness in the North.

Sudan APG Meeting with Sadig al Mahdi, 150108