• Nafie Ali Nafie, Presidential Advisor
• Deng Alor, Sudanese Foreign Minister
• Mustapha Osman Ismail, Special Advisor to President Beshir

Deng Alor is Sudanese Foreign Minister. He is a Dinka from Abyei, a disputed oil-producing border region between Northern and Southern Sudan. In October 2007, Alor was appointed foreign minister of Sudan, replacing fellow Southern Sudanese politician Lam Akol, in what was seen as an attempt to appease the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement. Alor had previously been Minister of Cabinet Affairs.

Mustafa Osman Ismail is advisor to President Beshir. He was the foreign minister of Sudan from 18 February 1998 to 18 September 2005. His main job as foreign minister was to be the government’s main spokesman in diplomatic efforts to solve the Sudanese civil wars. He was the longest-serving foreign minister in Sudanese history.

Anna Chancellor is a star of the screen and stage, much loved for her role in Four Wedding and a Funeral. Denis Lawson is best known for starring in the original Star Wars trilogy and most recently in the award winning BBC production Bleak House.

An exhibition of original artwork from Darfuris was also on display at the event, which was extremely well attended by an audience which included expert analysts and Darfuri refugees.

Speakers included:

• Archbishop Daniel Deng, the new Primate of Sudan
• Tim Thornton, Bishop of Sherborne
• Michael O’Neill, UK Special Representative on Sudan
• Andrew Mitchell MP, Shadow Secretary of State for International Development
• Jo Trevor, World Vision Sudan Office

The meeting took place under Chatham House rules and resulted in a lively debate, involving an audience drawn from the UK parliament, the UK humanitarian and advocacy community, faith communities, and the wider Sudanese Diaspora. Key issues were highlighted, in particular the priority of sustained development in building long lasting peace and security. There were also worrying reflections of the difficulty of constructive dialogue between members of different faiths, emphasizing the need for a determined and patient engagement.

Richard Williamson has became the Special Envoy to Sudan on January 7, 2008.  Mr. Williamson is also a practicing partner in the law office of Winston and Strawn.  Earlier in the Bush Administration, Williamson, who has broad foreign policy and negotiating experience, served as Ambassador to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs and as Ambassador to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.

Previously, he served in senior foreign policy positions under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, including as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations at the Department of State, and an Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs in the White House. He also has served as Chairman of the Illinois Republican Party.

Williamson is active in a wide variety of civic organizations, serving on the board of directors of the International Republican Institute; the board of the Committee in Support of Russian Civil Society; a member of the advisory committee for the International Human Rights Center, DePaul University, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Williamson received an A.B.,cum laude, in 1971 from Princeton University. He received a J.D. in 1974 from the University of Virginia School of Law, where he was executive editor of the Virginia Journal of International Law.

Williamson has authored seven books and edited three. He has written more than 175 articles in professional and popular periodicals.

The meeting brought together a small group of senior parliamentarians, experts from the humanitarian and political scientific community, representatives of the two parties to the CPA, and UK policy makers to discuss how international actors should be working to prevent an escalation of conflict in the region specifically and to promote implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement more generally.

The escalating clashes around Abyei between various groups including Misseriya Arab militias, and the SPLA culminated on 20th May 2008 in direct fighting between regular Sudanese armed forces and the SPLA resulting in 22 dead soldiers, up to 50,000 IDPs, and the razing of Abyei town. This event represented the most serious breakdown in the ceasefire between the Government of Sudan troops and SPLA rebels since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005. Although a roadmap agreement – reached by a joint committee from the two partners in the national unity government – has now been signed, Abyei will remain a severe strain on the CPA as we move towards elections in 2009. It is vital that international actors urgently develop a strategic response to the threats –present and future - to peace in Sudan and fulfil their functions as guarantors of the agreement.

The Briefing which was circulated prior to the meeting can be found below. Please contact the Sudan APG Co-ordinator if you would like to receive a fuller report from the meeting.

ABYEI BRIEFING, June 2008

• Background

The Abyei region is an oil rich area located on Sudan’s North-South border. Historically it is unique, having developed a reputation as a bridge between North and South Sudan, especially during the later British colonial period. It is home to the Ngok Dinka tribe, cousins of the South’s Dinka tribe and bordered to the north and north east by the Misseriya, Arab cattle herders who pass through every year to graze their animals. Relations between the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka have historically been amicable but following Sudanese independence in 1956, they were pulled towards opposite sides in the country’s civil wars.

Abyei repeatedly surfaces as a key factor in Sudan’s North-South struggle. The recent crisis in Abyei represents a microcosm of the core issues that were addressed by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/M). Abyei also suffers from the same underlying tensions and unresolved issues that have fuelled previous conflicts within Sudan.

• Recent fighting in Abyei

May 20th Attacks: What began as a small clash between SPLA police and Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) aligned militia escalated by 14th May into a full scale military attack by the latter on Abyei town. On 18th May, the parties agreed with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of excess forces from in and around Abyei. However, the ceasefire failed to hold, and the SAF failed to re-deploy its 31st Brigade from Abyei as agreed. On 20 May, the SPLA launched a counter-attack on the town, further escalating the situation. The CPA has wobbled before but this is the heaviest fighting between the two parties since the deal was signed in 2005.

Humanitarian situation: Renewed fighting has destroyed the town of Abyei and displaced tens of thousands of local Dinka from their homes. The United Nations has so far found 89 bodies in the Abyei region, 68 of which were from the military. Many of the displaced are crowded into the small town of Agok, south of Abyei. There are also reports that Dinka IDPs living in villages around the town of Mugled to the North have been attacked by Misseriya tribesmen. Escape routes out of the region are controlled by the Baggara tribe, who have reportedly looted the belongings of Dinka IDPs trying to leave the area. Aid workers say they do not believe the refugees from Abyei will be able to return home soon. They expect they will need food and shelter right through the current rainy season, if not for longer.

June 9th deal: Since the fighting, a deal has been struck between President Omar al-Bashir and First Vice President Salva Kiir. The agreement or ‘roadmap’ includes:

• • the creation of a joint military and civil interim administration in the region, with an SPLM official as chief and an NCP official as deputy chief; This includes a 640-strong joint north-south force is due to be deployed this week to try to keep the peace in Abyei;
  • the possibility of international arbitration to oversee the process - North and South have agreed to allow a month to identify the best global body to help them reconcile Abyei differences;
  • an agreed interim border;
  • an oil sharing arrangement – that oil revenues will be split roughly half-half in the future;
  • free access to UNMIS to help displaced people return to their homes by 30 June;

The deal may look promising but the stakes are high and history militates against too much optimism. The 2005 agreement similarly called for a transitional government aimed at local autonomy and fair distribution of oil wealth, with a local referendum to finally settle matters in 2011. Midway through that process, little progress has been made and leaders in both the north and south seem all too willing to continue militarising the dispute, using local tribes as their proxies. Given the ineffectual nature of international enforcement, and the potential wealth riding on the outcome, it remains to be seen whether both sides will be willing to accept the consequences of a democratic peace process.

• Abyei and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Deal

Volatility remains because the root causes of the Abyei conflict are still present. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement granted the disputed territory, which has a significant proportion of Sudan’s oil reserves, a special administrative status under the presidency and a 2011 referendum to decide whether to join what might then be an independent South.

CPA implementation failures with respect to Abyei have made the area highly unstable. They include the failure of the parties to establish an administration in the area, define the borders, and satisfy obligations related to security, the distribution of wealth, delivery of basic services, and the return internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. The SPLM’s 11 October 2007 decision to suspend its participation in the Government of National Unity in protest of the NCP’s non-implementation of the CPA marked the beginnings of a very dangerous political escalation.

Some of the key issues are discussed below:

The 2011 referendum

In violation of the CPA, the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) is refusing the ‘final and binding’ ruling of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) report, leaving an administrative and political vacuum. These actions have contributed to already existing disagreements about governance in the Abyei area, including what constitutes an administration that the Abyei Protocol requires to be ‘representative and inclusive of all the residents in the area’.

The uncertainty about what the 2011 referenda in Abyei and South Sudan holds for the future of Sudan has been a major obstacle to peace and security in Abyei.

Control over oil resources

The Abyei Protocol, which came into effect on 1 January 2005 outlined an interim oil revenue sharing plan for the area, until the 2011 referendum. The NCP’s refusal to accept the ABC boundaries, however, means that Abyei’s oil revenue has not been distributed as it should have. International Crisis Group estimates that revenue from Abyei’s oil fields was roughly $529mn for 2007. While Abyei’s oil is being depleted and revenue estimates beyond 2007 begin to drop significantly, existing fields contain the majority of oil in the North, and revenues from them are critical to the survival of the NCP.

If Abyei’s remaining oil reserves are likely to be very small by 2011 relative to other Sudanese reserves, Abyei may become a lesser bone of contention between Khartoum and any possible future independent government in the South. Regardless of production though, Abyei will remain strategically important because of its pipeline infrastructure.

The Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka/Misseriya dynamic

Bringing peace to region will require addressing the local dimension between the Ngok Dinka and the neighbouring Misseriya communities. Nurtured by the NCP, the Misseriya are suspicious that the implementation of the Abyei protocol and a referendum on joining the South would mean loss of grazing rights and they are concerned about their survival as a pastoralist community. At the same time there is a risk that frustration at the lack of implementation among local Ngok Dinka youth could lead to spontaneous violence in the area, which could in turn easily spark a broader conflict.

However, oversimplification of the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya dynamic tends to paint the Misseriya as a homogenous group aligned with the NCP and against Dinka interests. In fact, a shift is underway in the region. Anger in the Misseriya community towards the NCP (over key issues including the negative community and environmental impact of oil development, and a provision in the CPA which dissolved the Misseriya dominated province of Western Kordofan into Southern Kordofan) is increasing, causing significant numbers to seek to join the SPLA, because they see Juba as a closer and friendlier power centre than Khartoum. International Crisis Group reported in October 2007 that between 10,000 and 15,000 Misseriya troops were camped in Debaab hoping to join the SPLA. The NCP has tried repeatedly to woo the Misseriya back, with visits from senior officials, including Bashir, but Misseriya opposition appears to be growing.

Military movement and UNMIS

The uncertain level of command and control over Northern and Southern military forces in Abyei raises concerns that miscalculations or independent actions by either party’s armed forces or their proxy militias could spark renewed conflict. The instability in Abyei was heightened by the deployment of SAF and SPLA forces along the borders of Abyei and within Abyei itself, as well as the operation of militias in the area – all contrary to the provisions of the CPA. Increasing violent clashes involving the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya and the severe restrictions placed on the UN monitoring forces (UNMIS) have further contributed to this instability.

UNMIS is mandated to monitor the situation on the ground but despite armoured personnel carriers, the UNMIS contingent of mainly Zambian troops was reluctant to move outside its headquarters during the attacks on May 20th. Last week the US Special Envoy for Sudan, Richard Williamson, accused UN Peacekeepers of failing to protect citizens during the clashes.

The Role of the International Community

Leading observers are stressing that now is the time for the international community to preventively engage with the leadership of both the NCP and the SPLM before the situation gets further out of hand.

This is a key moment for the CPA’s international guarantors, led by the US which authored the Abyei Protocol, to become more active again. Those who signed the CPA, and others who have a duty to re-engage include Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and US, the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and its International Partners Forum, the Arab league, the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union.

There is a strong consensus that Abyei’s fate is tied directly to that of the CPA and that what happens in Abyei is likely to determine whether Sudan consolidates the peace or returns to war.

El Khidir hails from Darfur and focused on issues pertaining to Darfur and Chad, whilst Patience dealt with relief and development in South Sudan and progress towards implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The briefing offered a valuable opportunity for members of the APG to gain a better understanding of exactly how far Sudan has come, what the recent attack on Omdurman and violence in Abyei mean, and to ask what a truly comprehensive peace for the region would really look like.

A report which seeks to identify the key factors contributing to instability in Abyei and to identify actions that can be taken by the key domestic actors and the international community to begin to reduce tension and resolve the conflict.

The delegation included:

• Abdallah Yahya, President - Abdalla Yahya (a Zaghawa Wogi) is principal leader of SLM-unity. Formed in April 2007, SLM-Unity is the strongest group (SAS 2008) in Darfur, and has good connections to other groups and the Chad regime (although it is more autonomous than the Justice and Equality Movement.

• Dr Sharif Harir - A leader and negotiator for the SLM, Dr Harir is a former professor of social anthropology at the University of Khartoum

• Suleiman Jamous - Suleiman Jamous was humanitarian coordinator for the SLM under Minnawi (the one Darfur leader who signed the Abuja peace agreement in 2006). He was subsequently arrested and tortured by the Minawi group and the Government of Sudan for opposition to the Darfur Peace Agreement. He was released to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) from Muzbat on 22 June 2006. He was taken to Al Fasher, the capital of North Darfur State, where he remained under UN protection for over a year – essentially imprisoned in the UN hospital in Kadugli for 14 months. According to humanitarian sources, Jamous was appreciated by the UN and ONGs aid workers in Darfur for his good collaboration and competence. The UN finally flew him out on a helicopter – a move which led to the Government of Sudan to temporarily suspend all UN operations in Darfur.

The notes below are summaries of presentations and do not represent the views of the group. Please contact the Sudan APG Co-ordinator for more comprehensive notes from this meeting.

During discussions, Parliamentarians and invitees stressed the following points:

• Primacy of peace process
• Disappointment at the failure of rebel groups to reach consensus on vision or leadership
• The need for movements to ensure humanitarian access to populations living in areas under their control

• SLM-Unity stance

SLM-Unity are making every effort to bring peace to Darfur and Sudan, having taken to arms in the struggle for peace and justice. Peace is needed today, not tomorrow. SLM-Unity are committed to abide by the law of the international community and to respect all international legislation, and appeal to the United Kingdom and the rest of the international community to contribute to bringing peace to Sudan and exercising more pressure on the government of Sudan to encourage them to abide by the law and stop all aspects of genocide. Sudan needs the contributions and cooperation of the international community to enable the ICC to carry out its duties.

SLM-Unity, as one of the major four powers/factions in Darfur, believe it is important to deal directly with those who have the support of the people - not tiny movements or operations - and encourage visitors to come to the field so they can understand the real powers there.

SLM-Unity are compelled to carry weapons, the blame for which lies with the government. If peace negotiations fail, armed struggle is the only alternative measure, but SLM-Unity reassure that they are looking for peace through every possible means.

The situation in Darfur is catastrophic, the suffering is ongoing and becoming worse and worse. The hybrid UNAMID force is not capable of bringing peace if they cannot protect the communities. Air strikes and bombings continue, as illustrated by the attack on the school last week which killed women and children, and UNAMID failed to protect these civilians or even report what happened. The African Union also failed to protect IDPs from the Janjawid and others.

In 1968-69 Nimeiri was supported by Communist Russia. This latest regime is supported by Islamists. These two groups – the Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood - have destroyed Sudan. In principle, SLM-Unity are against extremism and clearly call for the separation of religion and power – religious institutes should not interfere in political affairs. National syllabuses and curriculum should be cleared of these issues.

• Trip to Europe

This trip to the UK and Europe was planned before the Prime Minister’s proposal to hold peace talks in the UK – indeed they should have arrived a month and a half ago but were delayed because of difficulties in obtaining visas. The purpose of the trip is to give a clear image of what is going on in Darfur and to invite the international community to be involved, where the international community has previously been isolated and not part of the peace process, or aware of the weaknesses of the AU and UNAMID. This delegation has visited some other European countries – the UK is the last destination as they want to focus mainly on their work here, where they hope and believe meetings will yield the most fruitful results.

SLM-Unity have a crisis of confidence with the joint mediators based on a long experience with them, and believe they have been infiltrated by the government – whoever the GoS recommends, the mediator endorses (resulting in a GoS estimate for the number of rebels groups as high as 38). The delegation believe that if the UK visited Darfur it would be clear who dominated the region – the four main factions.

• Steps towards peace

SLM-Unity are part of a united SLM. Although SLM-Unity refused to recognize the results of the Haskanita conference, which they viewed as a coup d’etat, they have since declared themselves as part of a united body working for the movement as a whole. Representatives of this group have spoken to all other movements and factions in Darfur to look at the prospects of unifying into one main body. Over the past year and a half there has been some success, including with those from Arab tribes (not Janjawid, but the same tribe). In Darfur there are 300 tribes and any united movement for peace should be seen as one tribe. At this point almost 80% of Darfuris are part of the SLM movement, including Minni Minnawi and Abdel Wahid el Nur. People in Darfur and Sudan have begun to look at the movement as national. SLM-Unity are preparing to be a national party, with a motto and plan incorporating the inclusion of all others.

A delegate of SLM-Unity went to the field from October – February to speak about unification. Very encouraging responses were received, but there have been few results – the political process is not easy, and although their attitude is not one of pessimism, this is not encouraging. There is ongoing assessment of what is going on in the field, the result, and how that will affect the future of civilians in Darfur. The challenge for all parties will be how to divert civilians from this kind of life to a normal civil life. SLM-Unity want peace today, not tomorrow, and these issues cannot be addressed if conflict continues for the next five years.

Better planning from western countries and the international community is needed, including planning with experts for the future of Darfur. A common platform, bringing together the four main groups, would yield the most successful results.

• Response to recent events

Census

Mahgoub Hussein signed a document threatening the execution of census takers, however this should be viewed merely as a deterrent in frightening those involved in the census. Any census takers captured are being detained, but kept alive and will eventually be sent back to their families.

Omdurman

Omdurman was the result of the disease of the fragmentation of a movement and an unwillingness to come together. SLM-Unity played no part in what happened with JEM in Khartoum, and heard about the attack after it happened.

A better result would be reached if all the factions sat together and planned together (see above).

Women

The rights of women and children have been neglected. Although the government has imposed restrictions, with the help of humanitarian agencies SLM-Unity has succeeded at giving them some help at a good level. During the war, education was almost non-existent, but with aid from humanitarian agencies a good effort has been made.

This is a transitional period – SLM Unity are looking forward to going to the capital to become part of the Sudanese system and carry all of these concerns with them. There are good examples of these issues being addressed within the movement – with women and children represented in the army and the political view.

China and Arab League

China and the Arab League have clearly been relaxed with the current government despite the existence of a dictatorship. They are only looking after their own interests, regardless of how the government behaves. When SLM-Unity are part of the government, they intend on rethinking these relationships.

Together with SPLM, SLM-Unity plan to create a new Sudan. From that time, China and the Arab League will regret cooperation with the current government.

“People with health needs today simply cannot wait for a time when there is a functioning health care system with enough medical facilities and sufficiently trained staff.

More than three years after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, medical needs remain critical, and simmering tensions create a precarious security situation. The 21-year civil conflict killed 2 million people and forced more than 4 million from their homes, according to U.N. estimates. Three years later however, the health situation of the populations of southern Sudan is still dire with high levels of mortality and morbidity; humanitarian aid still needed.

A viable health system for southern Sudan’s estimated 8 million people will take years and significant investment, while acute health needs will still need to be met. Slow release of longer-term development funds hamper the maintenance and development of the poor existing health structures. The remaining emergency medical organizations therefore are shouldering an impossible burden trying to meet basic health needs. Today, MSF health facilities in Greater Upper Nile are functioning at maximum capacity.” — Medecins Sans Frontieres